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“Preparing for the Quantum Age: When Cryptography Breaks”

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Information Technology, and Government Innovation”

June 24, 2025 (recording linked here)

HEARING INFORMATION

Witnesses and Written Testimony (Linked):

• Dr. Scott Crowder: Vice President, IBM Quantum Adoption

• Marisol Cruz Cain: Director, Information Technology and Cybersecurity, Government Accountability Office (GAO)

• Denis Mandich: Chief Technology Officer, Qrypt

• Brenda Rubenstein: Associate Professor of Chemistry and Physics, Director of the Data Science Institute, Brown University

HEARING HIGHLIGHTS

IN THEIR WORDS

SUMMARY OF OPENING STATEMENTS FROM THE SUBCOMMITTEE

• Chair Mace emphasized the importance of understanding quantum computing, despite its complexity. She explained that quantum computing operates on fundamentally different principles from classical computing, enabling it to solve problems that traditional systems cannot, with applications in fields such as drug discovery and national security. Mace warned that advanced quantum computers could render current encryption obsolete, posing serious risks to sectors like finance, healthcare, and defense. She highlighted the bipartisan Quantum Computing Cybersecurity Preparedness Act, which she co-led, and urged timely federal migration to post-quantum cryptography to counter foreign threats using "steal now, decrypt later" strategies.

• Ranking Member Brown underscored the urgency of protecting Americans’ data from future quantum threats. She introduced a bipartisan bill aimed at modernizing federal electronic consent systems, but stressed that strong encryption is also vital to safeguarding data. Brown noted that quantum computing, while still a decade or two from full capability, will eventually compromise current encryption methods and that adversaries like China and Russia are already stockpiling encrypted data. She advocated for continued federal investment in quantum research, highlighted successful applications like the Cleveland Clinic's quantum healthcare research, and criticized past federal funding cuts, arguing they jeopardize America’s leadership in scientific innovation.

SUMMARY OF WITNESS STATEMENT

• Dr. Crowder (IBM) testified that IBM leads in quantum computing, operating over 80 quantum systems and partnering with more than 275 institutions to explore real-world applications. He explained that quantum computing, marking a second quantum revolution, enables new possibilities in medicine, materials, and logistics by solving problems classical computers cannot. He highlighted IBM’s recent breakthroughs, including a 100+ qubit system and plans to build a large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computer by 2029. Dr. Crowder urged Congress to invest in high-performance quantum infrastructure, support algorithmic innovation, and accelerate the adoption of post-quantum cryptography to maintain U.S. leadership and security.

• Ms. Cruz Cain (GAO) emphasized the dual nature of quantum computing—its potential to solve critical problems and its threat to current encryption standards. She warned that quantum computers could eventually break today’s cryptography in hours, posing risks to government and critical infrastructure systems. She noted that while Congress passed the Quantum Computing Cybersecurity Preparedness Act in 2022, the federal government still lacks a unified national strategy to address quantum threats. She recommended that the Office of the National Cyber Director lead coordination efforts and emphasized the need for a quantum-trained workforce and sustained investment in research.

• Mr. Mandich (Quantinuum) described the national security urgency posed by quantum computing and the inadequacy of current reactive cybersecurity models. He warned that foreign adversaries, especially China, are already intercepting and storing encrypted U.S. data through “harvest now, decrypt later” strategies. He argued that post-quantum cryptography must be adopted rapidly, despite its complexity, and that the government must lead by refusing to purchase non-compliant systems. Mandich stressed that waiting for a perfect solution is dangerous and that proactive, crypto-agile architecture and systemic reform are essential to withstand the coming convergence of quantum and AI threats.

• Dr. Rubenstein (Brown University) highlighted quantum technology’s transformative potential and its critical role in national defense, medicine, and scientific advancement. She explained that quantum computers could solve complex problems beyond the reach of classical systems, but emphasized that success depends on training a highly interdisciplinary workforce. She raised concerns about steep budget cuts to federal basic research and graduate training programs, warning that such reductions undermine the future of quantum leadership in the U.S. Dr. Rubenstein called on Congress to support basic scientific research as the foundation for innovation and to safeguard the next generation of quantum scientists.

SUMMARY OF KEY Q&A

• Chair Mace asked what progress the federal government has made since the passage of the Quantum Computing Cybersecurity Preparedness Act. Ms. Cruz-Cain responded that agencies are still in the early stages, having only just begun system inventories, funding assessments, and testing NIST's post-quantum cryptographic standards.

  Chair Mace asked all panelists what keeps them up at night regarding quantum computing. Mr. Mandich said he worries about having publicly committed to roadmaps that adversaries can track and about the complex implementation of cryptographic upgrades. Dr. Crowder emphasized the challenge of staying ahead while publicly disclosing IBM's technical milestones. Ms. Cruz-Cain cited fears about “harvest now, decrypt later” data collection and the risk posed by budget cuts. Mr. Mandich added concern about China’s silence on its quantum progress, the lack of a backup algorithm for encryption, and the compounding risk if failures align. Dr. Rubenstein said she fears the diminishing pipeline of U.S.-trained quantum experts and the loss of American leadership in the field.

  Chair Mace asked for an assessment of China’s quantum capability. Mr. Mandich said China is consolidating stolen research in a centralized facility and investing heavily in workforce development, unlike the U.S., which depends entirely on federally funded research to support its own quantum industry. Chair Mace then asked how AI plays into China’s and the U.S.’s quantum efforts. Mr. Mandich responded that AI is highly useful for breaking encryption and enhancing cryptanalysis, and warned of an inevitable, sudden breakthrough similar to what occurred with ChatGPT. Chair Mace asked how far behind China is in AI development. Mr. Mandich said China’s silence and extensive access to U.S. company data—often through remote employment in Chinese intelligence-linked settings—suggest they may already be ahead and preparing a major leap.

• Rep. Subramanyam asked about the consequences if a bad actor gains access to quantum capabilities that break encryption.
  Ms. Cruz-Cain said it could severely affect national security, military operations, and individual privacy, as much of the data stolen today will still be sensitive in 10–20 years. Rep. Subramanyam asked whether quantum could break Bitcoin encryption and what steps Congress should take. Ms. Cruz-Cain explained that Bitcoin and similar systems are vulnerable once a quantum computer capable of breaking encryption emerges, and she highlighted gaps in the federal risk assessment strategy and the absence of concrete implementation milestones.

  Rep. Subramanyam asked about the Bitcoin risk. Mr. Mandich stated that once quantum breaks encryption, the largest Bitcoin wallets could be seized and irreversibly drained, rendering the currency worthless due to lack of regulatory recovery mechanisms.

  Rep. Subramanyam asked whether the Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD) is equipped to lead the quantum strategy. Ms. Cruz-Cain replied that ONCD is the best-positioned agency to coordinate strategy, but underscored the importance of confirming its leadership. Rep. Subramanyam asked whether the National Cyber Director should have technical or cyber policy expertise. Ms. Cruz-Cain affirmed that technical experience is important.
  Rep. Subramanyam criticized the current nominee’s lack of cybersecurity credentials and expressed concern over the federal government’s loss of technical talent in critical areas, committing to push for stronger leadership and bipartisan reforms.

• Rep. Crane asked Dr. Rubenstein whether she was concerned that adversaries like China could surpass the U.S. in quantum computing. Dr. Rubenstein confirmed her concern, noting that unlike China, the U.S. freely shares information, which fosters innovation but also increases exposure. Rep. Crane then asked whether Brown University offers courses in quantum and nuclear engineering. Dr. Rubenstein confirmed that they offer courses in quantum computing but said most universities moved away from nuclear studies long ago. Rep. Crane questioned whether there are vetting procedures to prevent students from adversarial nations from accessing sensitive fields at Brown. Dr. Rubenstein replied that the university complies with existing federal laws and emphasized that most international students come to study and stay in the U.S. Rep. Crane challenged the adequacy of this approach, citing national security concerns, and suggested it was problematic to educate potential adversaries. Dr. Rubenstein acknowledged the concern but said decisions about law and policy should be made by experts and stressed the benefits many international students bring to U.S. innovation. Rep. Crane then asked whether she had raised these concerns within Brown University. Dr. Rubenstein said that such concerns had been considered internally. Rep. Crane inquired how many international students attend Brown. Dr. Rubenstein estimated that between 1,000 and 2,000 of the 8,000 students are international.

  Rep. Crane asked whether it was concerning that students from adversarial countries gain access to sensitive education through U.S. universities. Mr. Mandich replied that China uses its students as a major collection strategy and asserted that much of China's quantum expertise was trained in the U.S., calling for stricter limits and more domestic participation in technical fields.

  Rep. Crane asked Dr. Crowder to explain the practical power of quantum computing for a non-technical audience. Dr. Crowder explained that quantum computing is fundamentally different from classical computing and excels at solving problems in chemistry, materials science, and financial modeling that classical systems cannot.
  

• Ranking Member Brown asked what Congress should do immediately to secure federal systems and critical infrastructure against quantum threats. Mr. Mandich responded that beyond upgrading algorithms, the U.S. must also modernize equipment and train a new generation of experts, as current systems were built before cloud and AI connectivity.
  Ranking Member Brown then asked about the complexities of building a quantum-capable workforce. Ms. Cruz-Cain explained that workforce development requires multidisciplinary skills and greater collaboration between government, academia, and industry, with more funding for training and research programs.

  Ranking Member Brown next asked how federal funding supports her lab's research and student training. Dr. Rubenstein emphasized that most graduate students in the U.S. rely on federal funding, and its loss would severely reduce the research workforce. Dr. Crowder said IBM depends on a strong STEM pipeline and that more investment is needed in application and algorithm research. Mr. Mandich added that nearly all U.S. quantum companies were built on university or national lab research and that graduate students are essential to innovation.

• Rep. Burlison asked which quantum architecture IBM uses and why. Dr. Crowder explained that IBM uses superconducting qubits due to their speed and scalability, which make them suitable for practical computing. Rep. Burlison asked for clarification on how quantum states are measured. Dr. Crowder described the process as involving artificial atoms in superposition, and noted there are many methods to create quantum states. Rep. Burlison then asked if quantum algorithms rely on probability. Dr. Crowder clarified that quantum states are precise but measurement appears probabilistic, and called for more research into useful quantum algorithms.

  Rep. Burlison asked how quantum computing could impact healthcare. Dr. Rubenstein said quantum computers could dramatically speed up drug development by accurately simulating how drugs bind to proteins, something classical computers struggle to do.
  Rep. Burlison asked what enables U.S. firms to lead in quantum development. Mr. Mandich cited a strong private sector and startup ecosystem, but emphasized that no company could have entered the space without foundational research from U.S. national labs and universities. Rep. Burlison asked about newer companies like PsiQuantum. Mr. Mandich replied that even startups like PsiQuantum rely heavily on public research infrastructure and would not exist without prior federal investment.

• Rep. McGuire began by asking all witnesses whether quantum technology poses a national security threat. Dr. Crowder, Ms. Cruz-Cain, Mr. Mandich, and Dr. Rubenstein all answered yes.
  Rep. McGuire then asked which areas of U.S. innovation are most at risk of being surpassed by foreign adversaries. Dr. Crowder warned that while the U.S. currently leads in hardware, it lags in algorithm and application research where foreign governments are more aggressively investing.

  Rep. McGuire asked Ms. Cruz-Cain to assess China’s position in the quantum race and the risk if they develop a cryptographically relevant quantum computer first. Ms. Cruz-Cain said China is close behind the U.S. and warned that if they exploit stolen U.S. data with quantum computing, the consequences could be severe.
  Rep. McGuire asked the panel to define a cryptographically relevant quantum computer and estimate how close we are to building one. Dr. Crowder explained that such a system could emerge around 2030–2035 if current tech scales up, though algorithmic advances could accelerate that timeline.

  Rep. McGuire asked whether the U.S. would get advance warning before such a machine is deployed. Mr. Mandich responded that China would likely conceal such a breakthrough, and added that the winner in quantum could dominate the entire sector, just as past tech races produced singular winners.
  Rep. McGuire asked whether outdated government IT systems pose added risk. Ms. Cruz-Cain affirmed that legacy systems are a major vulnerability and may need complete replacement to transition to post-quantum cryptography.

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