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  • Nimitz Tech Hearing 12-10-24 - House Homeland

Nimitz Tech Hearing 12-10-24 - House Homeland

NIMITZ TECH NEWS FLASH

“Safeguarding the Homeland from Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)”

House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence and Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security

December 10, 2024 (recording linked here)

HEARING INFORMATION

Witnesses and Written Testimony (linked here):

Panel I:

  • Mr. Keith Jones: Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner of Air and Marine Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection

  • Mr. Robert W. Wheeler Jr.: Assistant Director of the Critical Incident Response Group, Federal Bureau of Investigation

  • Mr. Brad Wiegmann: Deputy Assistant Attorney General for National Security, Department of Justice

Panel II:

  • Ms. Cathy Lanier: Chief Security Officer, National Football League

  • Mr. Paul Schwennesen, PhD: Co-Director, Global Strategy Decisions Group

  • Mr. Jeffrey Baumgartner: Vice President of National Security and Resilience, Berkshire Hathaway Energy

HEARING HIGHLIGHTS

Lessons from Ukraine's Drone Warfare and Innovation

Ukraine's innovative use of UAS in its conflict with Russia showcased the revolutionary impact of small, cost-effective, and rapidly adaptable drone technologies in modern warfare. Ukrainian forces have leveraged decentralized innovation to create advanced, scalable systems that are reshaping military tactics. The hearing underscored the need to learn from Ukraine's successes by adopting flexible, bottom-up approaches that enable real-time experimentation and development. These lessons have implications not only for military readiness but also for improving homeland security and protecting critical infrastructure.

Challenges in Counter-UAS Technology and Policy

The effectiveness of current counter-UAS technology, such as signal jamming, was a key topic. Experts noted that adversaries have already developed countermeasures to bypass traditional jamming methods, using AI-driven and communication-independent technologies. This technological race, compounded by bureaucratic hurdles, has hindered the timely deployment of counter-UAS solutions. Witnesses advocated for reducing bureaucratic barriers, accelerating procurement processes, and fostering public-private collaboration to create a robust suite of counter-UAS capabilities.

Evolving Threats of UAS to Critical Infrastructure

UAS present a rapidly growing threat to critical infrastructure, including energy facilities, transportation systems, and communication networks. Witnesses emphasized that adversaries could use UAS for surveillance, delivering hazardous payloads, disrupting operations, and enabling cyber intrusions. The accessibility and sophistication of UAS technology have outpaced the existing regulatory frameworks, leaving infrastructure vulnerable to malicious actors. The hearing highlighted the urgent need to modernize counter-UAS defenses, develop collaborative strategies, and provide critical infrastructure owners with tools to detect and mitigate threats effectively.

IN THEIR WORDS

"Unmanned systems are not just an iteration. They are indeed a revolution in the application of lethal force... The rules of the arms race have been fundamentally rewritten to favor small, cheap, easily mastered weapon systems."

- Dr. Schwennesen

"Information jamming doesn’t work the way we think it does. There are so many new developing technologies on countering the counters, and they’ve already gone multiple layers ahead of us at this point."

 - Ranking Member Magaziner

"I'm convinced that we're gonna have a problem. We'll wake up when something happens, because that's always what we do, and we should be waking up right now.”

 - Chairman Gimenez

SUMMARY OF OPENING STATEMENTS FROM THE SUBCOMMITTEES

  • Chairman Pfluger opened the hearing by emphasizing the growing threat posed by UAS, or drones, to U.S. national security and public safety. He highlighted the transformative impact of UAS on various industries, such as agriculture and law enforcement, but underscored their misuse for espionage, smuggling, and weaponized attacks. The Chairman noted incidents involving Chinese-manufactured drones and concerns about their potential links to forced labor and national security risks. He stressed the need to extend and reform current counter-UAS authorities, citing bipartisan efforts to pass legislation like HR 8610, which aims to balance security measures with civil liberties.

  • Ranking Member Magaziner emphasized the rapid technological arms race between criminals misusing UAS and law enforcement agencies. He detailed instances where UAS disrupted major events and were used in plots to attack critical infrastructure, such as power grids. Magaziner supported HR 8610, which seeks to expand UAS monitoring, tracking, and jamming technologies, while balancing the civil liberties of legal drone operators. He highlighted the dual nature of UAS as both a beneficial and threatening tool and expressed his hope for legislation to address the challenges effectively.

  • Chairman Gimenez focused on the growing threats from drones due to their widespread accessibility and potential for misuse. He highlighted the risks posed by uninformed operators and malicious actors, such as criminals and foreign adversaries, who exploit drones for smuggling, surveillance, and sabotage. The Chairman pointed to specific incidents, such as near-daily incursions at U.S. airports, and stressed the importance of safeguarding critical infrastructure and national events like the FIFA World Cup and the Olympics. He called for innovative solutions to counter rogue drones and urged swift action to mitigate these risks.

  • Ranking Member Thanedar highlighted the increasing prevalence of UAS across various sectors and their potential risks to U.S. critical infrastructure and public safety. He noted Congress’s efforts since 2018 to provide initial counter-drone authorities, though he stressed the need for expanded, long-term measures. Thanedar emphasized protecting privacy and civil liberties while ensuring airports and urban environments are safeguarded from drone threats. He expressed optimism about advancing counter-drone legislation and looked forward to the witnesses’ insights on measured and effective solutions.

SUMMARY OF WITNESS STATEMENT (Panel I)

  • Mr. Keith Jones described the increasing threats posed by UAS at the border, including their use by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) for reconnaissance and smuggling. He highlighted CBP’s counter-UAS operations and the importance of advanced technology to detect and mitigate these threats. Jones stressed the need for critical authorities provided by the Preventing Emerging Threats Act to address escalating risks, such as drones carrying explosives or narcotics. He concluded by emphasizing CBP’s commitment to countering UAS threats and enhancing border security.

  • Mr. Robert Wheeler Jr. outlined the evolving security challenges posed by UAS, including espionage, criminal activities, and kinetic attacks. He detailed examples, such as a Chinese national using UAS for surveillance and a white supremacist planning an attack on an energy facility. Wheeler emphasized the necessity of reauthorizing and expanding counter-UAS authorities to enable state and local partners to address the growing threats effectively. He highlighted the FBI’s limited capacity to cover all high-risk events and called for a long-term strategy to counter UAS threats.

  • Mr. Brad Wiegmann stressed the urgent need to reauthorize and expand counter-UAS authorities to address the increasing prevalence of drones. He outlined the legal challenges in using counter-drone technologies without proper authorization and emphasized broadening protections to include critical infrastructure and empowering state and local law enforcement. Mr. Wiegmann assured the committee that counter-UAS operations could be conducted while safeguarding privacy and civil liberties. He expressed the DOJ’s readiness to collaborate with Congress on durable legislation to protect public safety.

SUMMARY OF Q and A (Panel I)

  • Chairman Pfluger asked about the recent unexplained drone sightings in New Jersey and whether the public was at risk. Mr. Wheeler stated that the FBI, in collaboration with its Newark field office and state and local partners, was actively investigating the incidents but had not yet identified who was responsible. While he acknowledged no evidence of immediate harm, he expressed concern about the lack of information regarding the drones' operators and intentions. Chairman Pfluger followed up by asking why federal agencies could not take immediate action against drones over sensitive sites. Mr. Wheeler explained that while authority exists to mitigate UAS over designated sensitive sites, operational responsibility in cases like Langley Air Force Base falls under the Department of Defense (DoD). He highlighted the FBI’s close collaboration with DoD on such matters.

    Chairman Pfluger inquired about drone activity along the southern border, referencing reports of 20,000 incidents in a single quarter. Mr. Jones confirmed that drone activity near the border was significant and predominantly used by cartels for counter-surveillance, monitoring law enforcement activities 24/7. He explained that while CBP mitigated some drones, a large proportion operated in foreign airspace, making intervention challenging. When asked about the number of mitigations, Mr. Jones reported that CBP mitigated 60 drones in FY24 and explained that the majority of detected drones did not enter U.S. airspace. He emphasized the difficulty of mitigating drones that operate outside U.S. jurisdiction while highlighting CBP’s efforts to improve domain awareness and technology.

  • Ranking Member Magaziner asked whether cartels were using drones to transport fentanyl. Mr. Jones responded that while fentanyl smuggling via drones had not been observed, other drugs, such as cocaine and heroin, had been moved in small quantities. He attributed this to drones’ limited payload capacity. The Ranking Member questioned why the number of mitigations was low compared to the detections. Mr. Jones explained that only a small percentage of drones enter U.S. airspace, with many detections occurring in foreign airspace. He also noted that repeat offenders account for a significant portion of the incursions, complicating mitigation efforts

  • Ranking Member Magaziner asked about the need for expanding counter-UAS authority to state and local agencies. Mr. Wiegmann stressed that federal oversight and training would be critical to ensuring these entities operate within established guidelines. He explained that privacy and civil liberties protections, as well as coordination with the FAA, would be central to any expanded authority. The Ranking Member emphasized the importance of providing local agencies with the tools to counter drones effectively at events and facilities that federal agencies cannot cover. Wiegmann agreed, highlighting the need for additional resources and collaboration to address these gaps.

  • Chairman Gimenez raised concerns about AI-driven drones and asked whether the U.S. had the capability to counter such autonomous threats. Mr. Jones acknowledged the challenge and offered to discuss kinetic and electronic countermeasures in a closed session. Chairman Gimenez also asked about the potential links between Chinese-manufactured drones and cartels. Mr. Jones confirmed that most UAS technology used by cartels was manufactured in China, raising concerns about espionage and data security.

  • Ranking Member Thanedar asked how agencies ensure privacy when using counter-UAS technologies. Mr. Wheeler explained that the FBI’s tools only collect operational data, such as flight telemetry, and do not capture personal information unless it is part of an ongoing investigation. He emphasized the FBI’s strict guidelines for data retention and use.

    Ranking Member Thanedar asked how a pilot program for local agencies could balance expanded authority with privacy protections. Mr. Wiegmann stated that such a program would require extensive training and adherence to federal standards, ensuring that state and local actions align with federal privacy and safety guidelines.

  • Rep. Higgins argued that state and local law enforcement should have broader counter-UAS authority under the 10th Amendment. He criticized the limited mitigation rates, noting that CBP mitigated only 60 drones out of 45,000 detections. Mr. Jones clarified that many detections occurred in foreign airspace, limiting CBP’s ability to act, and that mitigation required meeting strict criteria.

  • Rep. Gonzales expressed frustration over the lack of clear answers and low budget allocations for counter-UAS efforts. Mr. Wheeler revealed that the FBI’s counter-UAS budget was under $500,000, which Gonzales deemed insufficient. Rep. Gonzales urged a more strategic approach, emphasizing the need for additional resources, training, and accountability.

  • Rep. Malliotakis highlighted drone sightings over sensitive infrastructure in her district and criticized the lack of coordination among agencies. Mr. Wheeler confirmed the FBI’s active investigation but acknowledged the lack of answers. Rep. Malliotakis urged interagency collaboration to identify the drones and address public safety concerns effectively.

  • Rep. Smith recounted multiple drone sightings off the New Jersey coast and called for DoD to deploy its counter-UAS capabilities to investigate and neutralize the drones. He emphasized the national security implications and urged the FBI to collaborate with DoD. Mr. Wheeler expressed shared frustration and agreed to work with DoD to improve counter-UAS efforts.

SUMMARY OF WITNESS STATEMENT (Panel II)

  • Mr. Jeffrey Baumgartner testified about the growing threat of UAS to critical infrastructure. He emphasized the importance of securing energy, transportation, communications, and water sector infrastructure, which are increasingly targeted by adversaries using UAS for surveillance, cyber intrusions, and physical attacks. Mr. Baumgartner highlighted gaps in current federal laws and regulations, which primarily focus on airspace management but fail to address malicious UAS activities. He proposed a comprehensive strategy, including granting critical infrastructure companies limited counter-UAS authority, improving information sharing, fostering R&D, and aligning efforts across all government levels while addressing privacy concerns.

  • Dr. Paul Schwennesen focused on the revolutionary impact of UAS technology on warfare, drawing lessons from the Ukraine-Russia conflict. He described how inexpensive, decentralized, and innovative drone systems have disrupted traditional military paradigms, creating an ecosystem of rapid technological evolution in Ukraine. Dr. Schwennesen warned that adversaries such as China and Iran are closely studying these developments and that the United States risks losing its strategic advantage if it fails to adapt. He urged the U.S. to learn from Ukraine’s decentralized innovation model and proposed forming a task force to gather intelligence on cutting-edge drone technology and tactics directly from the battlefield.

SUMMARY OF Q and A (Panel II)

  • Chairman Pfluger asked if the primary issue with UAS threats lies in technology, policy, or both. Dr. Schwennesen responded that it is a combination of both, citing bureaucratic barriers that hinder innovation and the need to improve technical capabilities. He emphasized the importance of reducing red tape and fostering a more adaptive approach to developing counter-UAS strategies, noting that traditional procurement processes are too slow for the pace of current threats. Chairman Pfluger then inquired why there has been no significant response to UAS activity in New Jersey and along the coastline. Dr. Schwennesen explained that fear of administrative consequences may deter action, with personnel hesitant to engage due to potential policy repercussions or liability concerns. He recommended improving both offensive and defensive UAS technologies while refining policies to empower authorities to act.

    Chairman Pfluger asked Mr. Baumgartner to outline the most catastrophic event that the energy sector should plan for. Mr. Baumgartner highlighted risks such as payload delivery to critical infrastructure and drone-enabled cyber intrusions. He noted the importance of a defense-in-depth strategy and suggested that energy companies collaborate closely with law enforcement to implement advanced counter-UAS technologies.

  • Ranking Member Magaziner commended Dr. Schwennesen for his work in Ukraine and emphasized the importance of supporting Ukraine’s fight for democracy and freedom. He asked Dr. Schwennesen to expand on his skepticism regarding the effectiveness of signal jamming technologies. Dr. Schwennesen explained that traditional jamming methods are becoming obsolete due to advancements in drone technology, including AI-driven systems and communication-free operation modes, which bypass standard electronic warfare measures. The Ranking Member followed up by asking what steps the U.S. should take to reclaim leadership in UAS innovation. Dr. Schwennesen recommended empowering frontline units to experiment with UAS solutions, moving away from top-down, centralized approaches. He stressed the need for rapid procurement processes and fostering a culture of "Yankee ingenuity" to accelerate innovation.

  • Ranking Member Magaziner also asked about best practices for collaboration between private industry and state and local law enforcement. Mr. Baumgartner highlighted fusion centers and regional information-sharing forums, such as the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, as effective platforms for maintaining these critical partnerships.

  • Chairman Gimenez asked if consolidating UAS threat responses under a centralized Homeland Security initiative would improve efficiency. Dr. Schwennesen agreed, pointing to Ukraine’s creation of a dedicated UAS force as a model. He explained that centralizing efforts could streamline coordination and enhance focus on counter-UAS strategies. The Chairman noted that the U.S. often reacts only after a crisis and emphasized the need to act proactively. He criticized the fragmented approach to UAS threats, where agencies operate independently with insufficient resources. Dr. Schwennesen agreed, stressing that the current decentralized approach lacks urgency and coherence.

  • Rep. D'Esposito asked about the risks posed by foreign adversaries transferring drone technology to domestic actors or transnational criminal organizations. Dr. Schwennesen stated that the risk is inevitable and emphasized the need to out-innovate adversaries to mitigate these threats. He highlighted that innovation is the most effective countermeasure against emerging risks.

    Rep. D'Esposito then asked about the physical security risks drones pose to the energy sector. Mr. Baumgartner explained that drones could deliver destructive payloads, ram critical infrastructure, or enable cyber intrusions. He advocated for a defense-in-depth strategy and better shielding of critical assets to mitigate these risks.

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